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Abstract
This paper painstakingly restores a vintage empirical model that re-
lates unemployment to shocks and institutions, and proceeds to run
it on recent data featuring dramatic shocks and controversial institu-
tional change. The original specication fails to t these data. The-
oretical insights and the results of suitably modied regressions sug-
gest that the capital ow and reforms implications of international
economic integration are crucial for interpreting twists and turns of
unemployment rates in Europe and elsewhere.
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1 Introduction
Unemployment is a vast issue, approached in this paper from the particular perspective originally
proposed by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000, henceforth BW).
Figure 1 displays unemployment rate paths over 5-year periods since 1960 for the countries in
the sample studied by BW. The sample stops with the 2010-14, as later observations would belong
to a currently incomplete period for which institutional information is not yet available. The data
are plotted separately and on di¤erent scales for current euro area members (Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain), other European countries
(Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom), and non-European countries (Australia,
Canada, Japan, New Zealand, United States). Separating these groups of countries improves the
graphs legibility and highlights the empirical motivation of BWs approach. In the rst portion
of the currently available time span, unemployment rates trended upwards in European (especially
Continental) countries, but moved cyclically along fairly stable and ultimately lower levels in other
(especially Anglo-Saxon) countries. To interpret that experience BW assessed the empirical t
of a model that confronts institutionally di¤erent countries with common shocks, and explored the
empirical relevance of three country-specic macroeconomic shock variables and of their interactions
with labor market institutions.
At just about the time when BW was being written the data began to look di¤erent. The
previous persistence or even hysteresis (Blanchard and Summers, 1986) of unemployment came to
an end in Europe. Unemployment rates began to decline and converge during the run up to and
early phases of Economic and Monetary Union, then surged and diverged as the Great Recession and
the European debt crisis hit. These data are very di¤erent in crucial respects from those analyzed
by BW and their references to the European Unemployment strand of 1990s literature. The data
sets used by Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005), Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2002), Bassanini and
Duval (2006) and other contributions that extending and nesse the BW approach also stop very
soon after 2000.
This paper revisits the BW empirical approach and applies it to recent data featuring contro-
versial labor market reforms and uncommon (unprecedented, and with di¤erent implications for
di¤erent countries) macroeconomic events. The empirical exercise o¤ers an opportunity to appre-
ciate and discuss conceptual and methodological aspects of BW, of the related work in Blanchard
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(1997, 2006) and in those papers references, and more generally of macro-level, policy-oriented
empirical work on labor market institutions and outcomes. Country panel regressions are not as
fashionable as they used to be. Because plausibly relevant variables and mechanisms are much more
numerous than available observations, empirical models that seek aggregate evidence unavoidably
oversimplify reality. The results can be confusing and misleading (Baccaro and Rei, 2007). The
statistical signicance of interesting coe¢ cients is sometimes driven by inclusion or omission of a
single countrys observations, and this and other regression specication choices can be suspicious
just because the results conrm specic theoretical priors. Empirical work on limited data cannot
always provide robust insights. But descriptive regressions, like paintings, can portray reality in an
interesting way, and crisply outline sensible theoretical mechanisms. The BW empirical approach
established that institutional heterogeneity does not fully explain country-level unemployment vari-
ation. The present paper suggests that a next step, focused on international spillovers triggered by
nancial integration, may help interpret sharp unemployment swings within Europe, and shed some
light on the determinants of the institutions that in turn determine unemployment.
Section 2 updates the BW regressions and nds that their original specication does not t recent
experience well. Section 3 revisits the structural underpinnings of the BW regressions, which treated
institutions as exogenous and adopted a closed-economy perspective, and outlines subsequent theo-
retical progress. In theory and reality international capital mobility and politico-economic tensions
are plausible and increasingly important drivers of labor market shocks and institutional reforms.
This suggests that accounting for variation of international economic integration can potentially
mend the empirical problems encountered by closed-economy regression specications in the more
recent portion of the updated sample. Section 4 runs regressions that extend BWs specication
to include current account information, and detect a signicant and correctly signed association
between unemployment and current account variation. This evidence, while as descriptive as the
original results, is remarkably consistent with plausible theoretical explanations of those results
recent disappearance. Exploratory regressions support this interpretation detecting a sensible asso-
ciation of current account variation and institutional reforms, which in turn account for a signicant
portion of unemployment variation. Section 5 concludes with a brief summary and discussion of
policy implications.
3
2 Restoration and update
In the following expressions Uct is the unemployment rate in country c and period t. Explanatory
variables Iict and Sjct are institutions (indexed by i) and shocks (indexed by j) in country c and
period t. All are measured as deviations from their mean within each regressions sample, which is
a slightly unbalanced panel if data are not available (see the Data Appendix for denitions, sources,
and plots of available observations by variable, country, and period). The regressions may also
include country xed e¤ects cc and period xed e¤ects tt.
2.1 Institutions and time
Table 1 considers a regression that related unemployment rates to period dummies, allowing this
time e¤ect to depend on time-invariant institutional characteristics of each country, and country
xed e¤ects:1
Uct =
 
1 +
X
i
iIic
!
tt + cc + "ct: (1)
The rst column replicates BW. The regression asks the data whether institutions matter di¤erently
at di¤erent times. This was a natural question when observing unemployment fanning out between
the 1970s and the 1990s. The answer is that observable institutional characteristics do signicantly
inuence the amplitude of unemployments variation over time. Institutions are measured in a way
that implies positive interaction coe¢ cients if generous unemployment insurance, strong employment
protection, large tax wedges, and pervasive unionization increase the persistence of unemployment
through cycles that would generate unemployment uctuations in less regulated economies, while
active labor market policies and wage-setting coordination (both taken with negative sign) reduce
unemployment persistence. The BW samples data conform to expectations in that most interaction
e¤ects are signicantly larger than zero.
The second column uses all currently available unemployment rates shown in Figure 1. For the
20 countries considered in BW the sample includes one-and-a-half as many 5-year periods, and ve
degrees of freedom are consumed by the new period e¤ects. Not surprisingly, some of the institutional
indicators measured in the late 1980s and early 1990s lose signicance: these are active labor market
1The current Stata syntax for this equation is
$DEPV = ( {i:$INST } )*( {tef:_Iperiod_*} ) + {tef:_Iperiod_*} + {c:_Icn_*}
where global $DEPV contains the name of an unemployment series and $INST those of institu-
tional variables.
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policy, which in BWs data (drawn from Nickell, 1997) was measured in a rather elaborate way that
would be di¢ cult to update and is particularly subject to data-mining suspicions voiced by BW;
and the tax wedge and union density, which in the updated series (see the Data Appendix) have
both changed rather di¤erently across countries. Other indicators do remain signicantly related to
unemployment variation even as it ceases to trend upwards in column 2, which runs the regression
on the complete updated sample, and column 3, which uses only its more recent portion.
The regressions in Table 2 relate unemployment levels to time-invariant institutions rather than
unrestricted country dummies,
Uct =
 
1 +
X
i
iIic
!
tt +
X
i
iIic + "ct: (2)
As in the original BW sample used in column 1, so in the updated and more recent samples of
columns 2 and 3 the interaction coe¢ cients are somewhat weaker than those estimated in Table 1.
Table 3 reports interaction coe¢ cient estimates from the nonlinear regression2
Uct =
 
1 +
X
i
iIict
!
tt + cc + "ct; (3)
which lets period e¤ects interact with time-varying indicators of country-specic labor market insti-
tutions. The results were not particularly strong in the original BW regressions replicated in columns
1 and 2. The remaining columns of the Table run the regression on the complete current sample,
using some time-invariant BW institutional indicators and updated indicators of unemployment in-
surance generosity, employment protection, labor taxation, and union density. These, documented
and shown in the Data Appendix, capture quantitatively some familiar trends (such as the secular
decline of unionization) and swings (such as the US increase and German decline of unemployment
insurance generosity in the 2000s). Regardless of whether only the originally available time-varying
indicators are updated (in column 3), and of whether time-invariant indicators of active labor policy,
union coverage, and wage setting coordination are included (in column 4) or excluded (in column 5),
unemployment insurance generosity and labor taxation have signicantly positive period-interaction
coe¢ cients, while employment protections interaction coe¢ cient is insignicant. Union densitys
interaction is mildly and negatively signicant only when indicators of wage-bargaining coverage and
coordination are omitted.
2In Stata,
$DEPV = ({i:$INSTtv})*({tef:_Iperiod_*}) + {tef:_Iperiod_*} + {c:_Icn_*} .
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2.2 Institutions and shocks
Consider next the role in the more recent period of the country-specic labor market shocks dened
by BW, and updated here as discussed in detail by the Data Appendix. These are the rate of total
factor productivity (TFP) growth, which is negatively associated with unemployment if real wages
fail to adjust to it, and measured with a negative sign to imply a positive expected coe¢ cient; the
real interest rate, which may be relevant through capital accumulation and in a variety of other
ways (Phelps and Zoega, 1998); and a dynamically adjusted log labor share which, under conditions
discussed in Blanchard (1997) and in Section 3 below, can capture the unemployment implications
of temporarily misaligned real wages.
Figure 2 plots these indicators, again separately on di¤erent scales for three groups of countries.
After the end of the BW sample, TFP ceases to slow down and uctuates widely in the run-up
to the great recession and in its aftermath. The real rate, after a strong increase in the 1980s,
declines sharply from the mid 1990s to the current secular stagnationphase, on time paths that
are very similar across countries. The labor demand shock turns positive in European countries only
after the end of the BW sample, and continues its previous upward trend in the control group of
non-European countries.
Table 4 reports the slope coe¢ cients of a linear regression of unemployment on these shocks,
country xed e¤ects, and a Pct dummy that equals unity only in Portugal for the period, coinciding
with the countrys revolution, when for that country the OECD Business Sector Database labor
share data behave in a very peculiar way:3
Uct =
X
j
iSjct + Pct + cc + "ct: (4)
The behavior of shocks is su¢ ciently diverse to disentangle their separate contributions to unem-
ployment variation. All three have positive coe¢ cients in column 1, which uses the original BW data
and sample. The coe¢ cients are still positive and signicant in column 2, which uses the updated
data set. Shockingly, however, the coe¢ cient of TFP growth has the wrong sign when in column 3
the early portion of the sample is dropped.
Table 5 reports the shock and institution coe¢ cients of a regression that allows institutions to
3BWs Table 4 did not control for this and estimated a less signicantly positive labor demand
shock coe¢ cient than in the present papers Table 4. These and other empirical results are only
mildly a¤ected by omitting the dummy, or indeed dropping all Portuguese observations.
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matter for the unemployment impact of shocks:4
Uct =
0@X
j
jSjct + Pct
1A 1 +X
i
iIic
!
+ cc + "ct: (5)
The t is very good in the original BW results of column 1, not much worse in the updated extended
sample of column 2 and in the recent sample of column 3. As shown in Figure 3, the estimated
empirical relationship captures not only unemployment increases between the 1970s and the 1990s,
but also the heterogenous and asymmetric developments of the following decades, when European
countries took turns in leading unemployment swings. In the recent past, however, the t and
predictive power of these regressions is mostly due to shocks, insignicantly shaped by time-invariant
institutions, and relies on a strangely signed TFP growth coe¢ cient.
The perverse association between unemployment and TFP growth in the periods when the latter
did not simply trend downwards, but began to uctuate and diverge, suggests that the BW empirical
approach does not appropriately account for something that has become important only since the
1990s. Labor market reforms are a potentially relevant source of variation. Following BW, Table
6 inserts time-varying institutional indicators in regression (5). The results do not add much to
previous ones. In the BW regressions replicated in columns 1 and 2 most interaction e¤ects are
insignicant and hard to interpret, and they remain so when using the complete updated sample in
column 3. Results for the most recent sample, not reported, are even weaker and harder to interpret:
the overall t is similar to that of the time-invariant institutions regressions of Table 5, and the shock
coe¢ cients are not positive.
3 Theory
The results of the previous sections restoration and update exercise qualify the BW insights: recent
data appear to be beyond reach of that papers empirical approach. This is useful food for thought,
and this section proceeds to discuss how the structural mechanisms that generate the data described
by the BW regressions may, in the light of older and newer theory, be inuenced by phenomena that
became more relevant since the 1990s.
To characterize the theoretical basis of regressions that relate observed unemployment to non-
4In Stata:
$DEPV = ({s:$SHCK}+{PORTDUM}*portrev) * (1+{i:$INST }) + {c:_Icn_*} ).
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linear functions of institutions and shocks, let each countrys per capita domestic production be
y = (kd)

(al)
(1 ), where l indexes employment and kd denotes the stock of capital. As discussed
below and in Blanchard (1997) it can be useful to relax the constant-elasticity assumption, which
however is very convenient also on the supply side of the labor market: if in income terms the
opportunity cost of employment l has the constant-elasticity functional form (l)1+ = (1 + ), then
the marginal cost l of labor supply equals
w = (1  ) (kd) (a)1  l  (6)
when unemployment is zero and the wage w corresponds to labors marginal productivity..
3.1 Institutions
To rationalize positive unemployment in the absence of shocks let market institutions be chosen, as
in Bertola (2016), so as to maximize the welfare of an individual who earns the per-capita labor
income and a proportion x < 1 of other per capita income. At given kd and a1  , the relevant
rst-order condition is5
(1 +  (x  1))w = l : (7)
If x = 1, then w = l : the welfare of the economys average individual is maximized at zero unem-
ployment. Just like unions that disregarding employersprots maximize the wage bill, however, so
individuals who earn only a portion of the economys non-labor income nd it optimal to decrease
employment. If x < 1 (the political majority is less wealthy than average), condition (7) drives a
proportional wedge between the market wage and the non-market value of time and reduces employ-
ment below the market-clearing level. The median voter is capital-poorer than the average individual
if wealth is more unequally distributed than labor income. In democratic countries, individuals who
earn less than the average non-labor income do support employment taxes and non-employment
subsidies, legal or collectively bargained minimum wages, limits on weekly work hours, minimum
annual holidays, and age-related employability rules (Bertola, 2016).
Employment rates also depend on educational policies and demographics (Bertola, Blau, and
Kahn, 2007), which are theoretically and empirically relevant also for unemployment (Bertola, Blau,
and Kahn 2002). To focus here on the unemployment implications of (7), suppose that institutions
5To see this add per capita labor income wl = (1  ) y to other income xy, di¤erentiate with
respect to l using dy=dl = w, and equate the resulting expression to l .
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keep wages are above the market-clearing level, and note that the welfare of a decisive individual
who earns a fraction x < 1 of average non-labor income is maximized at unemployment6
u  log ls   log ld = 

(1  x) (8)
This simple expression clearly oversimplies a reality where there is frictional unemployment even
in laissez faire and labor market institutions also address incomplete information and risk issues.
In models where wages are determined by decentralized match-level bargains, full employment is
unreachable if jobs are subject to shocks, matching them to unemployed workers requires costly
vacancy-posting and search activities, and wages and employment are determined by job creation
and wage determination schedules that cross at a point where unemployment is positive (Mortensen
and Pissarides 1994). The insight illustrated by (8), however, is robust to such extensions. Unem-
ployment can deviate persistently from its laissez faire level as an intentional side e¤ect of policies
meant to benet relatively poor individuals, implemented in each country in ways that depend on
the distribution of political decision power as well as on uninsurable shock histories.
The politico-economic mechanism underlying (8) may help interpret country-level relationships
between unemployment and the institutions that are empirically related to it. In its simplicity,
however, that expression illustrates how complicated it can be, even treating each country as an
isolated experimental unit, to interpret the empirical variation of unemployment. Its intentional
component may reect di¤erent values of the decisive agents labor intensity and political power (x
in the model), or of the elasticities ( and ) that shape the welfare implications of employment.
Depending on administrative traditions, employment may be shaped by contributions and subsidies
that leave measured unemployment constant, rather than by wage-setting constraints.
In empirical work, all this might be constant over time and absorbed by the country xed e¤ects
included in the BW regressions. But variation over time of a countrys institutions, driven by political
and structural forces, inuences unemployment directly and not just through interactions with period
e¤ects or observable shocks. The exclusion of institutional main e¤ects from the regressions reported
in Tables 3 and 6 was appropriate when trying to interpret di¤erent unemployment dynamics in
countries with stable institutions and similar exposure to largely common shocks. The stronger time
6Inserting (6) in (7) establishes that when x 6= 1 the log level of optimal employment
is lower by  (1  x) = ( + ) relative to the laissez faire zero unemployment level. The log
wage is 2 (1  x) = ( + ) higher along the labor demand schedule, log labor supply grows by 
2=

(1  x) = ( + ), and (8) follows.
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variation of institutions since the 1990s, when reforms began to be discussed and implemented at
di¤erent paces in di¤erent countries, is not necessarily absorbed by country and period e¤ects.
3.2 Shocks
To see how shocks can be relevant to observed variation of unemployment across countries and over
time, it is simplest to suppose that real wage are preset and, along with labor force participation
on an unchanged supply schedule, do not react to labor demand variation. (Real wages vary, with
more complicated but qualitatively similar implications, if nominal wages are preset and ination is
unexpected.) If the wage is preset at w expecting a = a0, at given kd employment and unemployment
deviate from their intended level if in realization a = a1 6= a0.
Combining log l = (log(1  ) + (1  ) log (a)  logw) = from (6) and (8), realized unemploy-
ment
~u  

(1  x) + 1  

(log (a0)  log (a1)) (9)
varies across countries and periods for two related but distinct reasons. One is that structural
features and institutions steer the wage away from the market-clearing level, as illustrated by (8)
and captured by the rst term on the right-hand side of (9). The other is that, at preset wages,
forecast errors move employment away from the level that the politico-economic mechanism would
choose after observing realized labor demand. The two mechanisms are related in that wages are
naturally preset if they are bargained collectively, and negotiation outcomes giving more weight to
labor income than to other income (x < 1 in terms of this simple formal framework) target a positive
level of unemployment that may ex post be reduced or increased by labor demand shocks.
Several theoretical renements are potentially relevant. If wage-setting and other relevant insti-
tutions only slowly adjust to changes in the relevant parameters, such as the  and  elasticities of
this simple model, similar shocks can have di¤erent employment implications across countries that
di¤er in those respects (Blanchard and Philippon 2004). And if decentralized wages are bargained
within a range of values that makes continued employment privately preferable to costly separation
and search may remain constant when shocks vary the boundaries of that range (Hall 2005), they
need not decline along with labor demand and can remain higher in recessions than would be justi-
ed by search and matching (Michaillat 2012). In that situation, the unemployed are rationed out
of jobs not by legal or contractual constraints but by their inability, in a decentralized bargaining
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framework, to bid down the wage of employed workers.
In terms of empirically observable variables, the identity ld = (wl=y) y=w and u   logw  log ld
yield unemployment u = (1 +) logw  log (wl=y)  log y, which deviates from zero if l 6=  logw. If
employment is on a constant-elasticity labor demand, then wl=y = (1  ) and, at given w, a constant
 implies a unitary coe¢ cient for output growth as an explanatory variable of unemployment changes.
In the data, that coe¢ cient varies considerably across countries and periods (Bertola, 2015), and is
much below unity (it was about one-half in Okuns original statement of his law).
One way to accommodate this is to allow the elasticity of labor demand, and the observed labor
share, to vary over time. BWs empirical implementation of this idea, outlined and reproduced in
the Data Appendix, constructs an empirical counterpart of the second right-hand side term of (9),
using the observed labor share to proxy  and TFP growth estimates to measure changes of a.
Another way is to relax the assumption that employment is on labor demand, and that employ-
ment somewhat implausibly adjusts faster than wages. If marginal productivity (1  )y=l exceeds
the wage by a proportional amount zw in a given time and period, then (1   )y=l = (1 + z)w,
and at constant  the labor share wl=y = (1  ) = (1 + z) varies if z does. Adjustment costs indeed
insert time-varying wedges between labors marginal revenue product and wage. When employment
is growing the labor share falls short of 1  , because z > 0: marginal productivity equals the cur-
rent periods wage ow plus the annuity value, along the employersoptimal path, of current hiring
costs and expected future ring costs. Conversely, when employment declines then z < 0 and the
observed labor share is larger than the technological elasticity. These e¤ects are more pronounced
when variation is perceived to be temporary (as explained for example in Bagliano and Bertola,
2007, chapter 3).
The BW regressions use the labor share as an indicator of labor demand changes at preset
wages, supposing that the parameters governing its relationship to unemployment are constant
across observations, or di¤er in ways captured by country e¤ects and institutional indicators. In
the original BW sample, the empirical role of labor share changes as determinants of unemployment
is correctly signed, statistically signicant, and distinct from that of TFP growth (which in the
presence of z wedge variation is, as conventionally estimated, a distorted version of a variation). In
recent data, however, variation of adjustment costs may require di¤erent specications.
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3.3 Capital and international integration
When capital can ow to or from the rest of the world, then the a countrys per capita wealth k
generally di¤ers from the domestic stock kd used in production. If capital ows into the country, a
larger kd increases labor demand
ld =

w
(1  )a1 
 1=
kd; (10)
and reduces observed unemployment at given wages. Tighter nancial integration triggers capital
inows and shifts the labor demand schedule (10) upwards for a country with relatively scarce
capital, and symmetrically reduces labor demand and increases unemployment at given wages for
a capital-abundant country. Thus, the last term in (9) should account among shocks not only for
TFP variation but also for the variation of kd that, at given k (and given wages or institutions),
may be induced by changes of capital mobility.
Bertola (2017) models the tightness of international integration supposing that the productivity
of foreign-owned capital in domestic production is lower than that of national capital.7 In that
setting, capital mobility also inuences wage determination, not only along the countrys labor supply
schedule but also through the politico-economic mechanism that, as outlined above and summarized
in the rst term on the right-hand side of (9). Capital inows are associated with stronger politico-
economic incentives to reduce employment and increase unemployment.8 Intuitively, the political
choice process only considers the interests of the countrys nationals, so it is more inclined to reduce
complementary capitals income when foreigners own a larger portion of its domestic stock. For a
country that experiences capital outows, theory has symmetric implications: employment declines
at given institutions, and institutions change in ways that tend to increase employment and reduce
unemployment.
7Formally, if   1 indexes the proportional productivity shortfall of a  amount of foreign-
owned capital then efective domestic capital is kd = k +  Solving for  the condition
 ((k + ) = (al))
 1
= ((K  ) (AL)) 1 of equal net capital productivity establishes that
al= (k + ) =

al +AL 

1 

= (k +K).
8Using the factor intensity expressions in the previous footnote, the optimality condition for
maximization with respect to l of the welfare of a decisive agent who earns the per capita labor
income and the unit return r = y=kd on a proportion x of the countrys average wealth is 
1 + 
 
xk
k + K
  al

1 
al

1  +AL
!!
w = bl ;
where the left-hand side is decreasing in .
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The role of interest rates and TFP as an explanatory variable in the BW unemployment regres-
sions was based on a theoretical perspective (Blanchard, 1996) that approximates each countrys
labor productivity around the steady state of its closed-economy capital accumulation path, and
models temporary uctuations (reecting lagged or costly adjustment) around a perfectly elastic
wage-employment relationship. Because international nance has developed strongly over the last
few decades, capital ows may help explain the relatively poor recent performance of that approach.
4 Back to the data
The updated and extended data set of Section 2s replication exercise is disciplined by independent
denitions and earlier use, and o¤ers a suitable empirical setting for assessing the practical relevance
of theoretical insights outlined in Section 3 and developed more fully in Bertola (2017) and its
references.
This section aims to see whether the empirical di¢ culties of the BW approach in capturing recent
unemployment developments can be remedied by attention to international nancial integrations
implications for labor market outcomes and distribution-motivated labor market institutions.
4.1 Unemployment and capital ows
Tighter nancial integration lets international capital ows inuence labor markets more strongly
and quickly than closed-economy capital accumulation dynamics. The relative capital scarcity of
countries need not be related to their position relative to their own conditional steady state, and
slow savings-driven dynamics can be dwarfed by quick capital movements, as was the case in the
initial phase of Europes Economic and Monetary Union (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002). The BW
shock series may therefore fail to capture country-specic phenomena that only became relevant as
nancial internationalization made it easier for capital to move internationally, and crises triggered
large nancial ows.9
9The empirical implications of capital ows for labor markets outlined in Section 3 can in fact
be traced to early observations by Blanchard (1997, p.130), who noted that the medium run labor
demand models predictions could be biased by the assumption that each economy was on its
steady-state growth path [;] if below, an increase in the ratio of capital to labor allows wages to grow
faster than TFP without adverse e¤ects on unemployment,and by Blanchard (2006), who noted
that in countries such as Spain unemployment was declining strongly in the absence of noticeable
labor market deregulation or favorable productivity developments.
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Figure 4 shows that current account / GDP ratios around 1990 began to uctuate widely and
more asymmetrically than the BW shocks.10 Across the samples advanced countries, a common
portion of international imbalances may have been driven by capital ows to and from emerging
countries, but current account developments were very heterogeneous especially among members of
Europes Economic and Monetary union. To the extent that current account variation is driven
by easier international mobility of capital, it is a plausibly exogenous driver of labor market con-
ditions, as domestic investment nanced by foreign wealth increases demand for complementary
labor (consumption-smoothing borrowing by previously liquidity-constrained countries has a simi-
larly positive labor demand e¤ect in their economiesnon-tradable sectors).
If asymmetric current account developments are signicantly related to unemployment, then
labor market shocks are poorly represented by common period dummies. One way to assess the labor
market relevance of nancial integration is to control for its empirical manifestation in unemployment
regressions. Tables 7 and 8 include a proxy of the size and direction of capital ows to the BW
capstone regressions that in Tables 4 and 5 recently cease to estimate sensible coe¢ cients. Current
account / GDP ratios are insignicant in column 1s original BW sample, suggesting that their
specication was appropriate at the time. However they are positively and strongly associated
with unemployment in column 2 (which includes the more recent data) and column 3 (which drops
the earliest third of the time periods): a positive partial association between unemployment and
current account surpluses captures the recently stronger association of external balances swings
with country-specic cyclical dynamics, which as discussed in Section 3.3 may plausibly have been
driven by tighter international economic integration.
Of course, including the current account in the linear combination of shocks fails to account fully
for unemployment developments in all countries, and Figure 5 suggests that the shocks of Table 8 do
not predict overall unemployment changes much better than those of Table 5 do in Figure 3. And
current accounts are also endogenously driven by heterogeneous productivity growth expectations
and other factors relevant to labor markets outcomes. To the extent that an interesting component of
both labor market and capital ow booms and boosts was jointly driven by international integration,
however, it is empirically plausible let it play a role similar to that of the BW "shocks" in driving
country-specic unemployment. And when controlling for current accounts, the coe¢ cient of TFP
10Capital stock estimates are somewhat sparsely available in the AMECO database, but it would
be complicated and much beyond the scope of this paper to model domestic savingscontribution
to capital accumulation.
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growth is insignicant, rather than strongly signicant but wrongly signed, and so is the labor
share-based demand shock. Tighter nancial integration does appear to imply that current accounts
capture labor market conditions better than indicators meant to represent closed-economy factors.
While arguably most relevant to the euro area experience, also in the broader panel data set analyzed
here this approach turns out to have considerable traction in rescuing BW-type specications.
4.2 Capital ows and reforms
In regressions that control for institutions, the international mobility of capital proxied by current
account variation should in theory and does empirically associate decits to lower unemployment,
and surpluses to higher unemployment. In Table 8 shocks are interacted with the original BW set
of time-invariant institutions. The most robustly relevant among them turns out to be the "Coor-
dination" index, constructed in the 1980s to account for persistently low unemployment in small,
homogeneous, Scandinavian countries, and rooted in country-specic industrial relations history and
cultural features (Blanchard and Philippon, 2006).
Theory associates economic integration also with institutional reforms that partly o¤set that
e¤ect, and tend to decrease employment in decit countries (Bertola, 2017): for a capital-importing
country, the politico-economic optimal employment is lower (relative to the higher laissez-faire level
implied by capital inows) in more integrated nancial market; conversely, exogenously more intense
capital ows imply that capital-exporting countries not only experience lower labor demand but also
have stronger incentives to deregulate their labor markets. This theoretical result is consistent with
the labor reform evidence generated by adoption of a common currency by some European countries,
a clearly identied and arguably exogenous nancial integration shock (Bertola, 2016), and is ar-
guably relevant to the most recent portion of the broader dataset analyzed here: if reforms increase
labor market rigidity and decrease TFP in countries where capital inows reduce unemployment,
the data generating process can yield a negative coe¢ cient for TFP in descriptive BW regressions
that, as in Tables 4 and 5, do not control for capital inows.
Anticipations and lags make it di¢ cult to disentangle labor demand and reform e¤ects in the
data. Seeking suggestive evidence, Table 9 asks the updated BW dataset whether labor market
deregulation is associated with current account surpluses. The answer is a qualied yes. Columns
1 and 2 regress 5-period changes of labor tax wedges and unemployment replacement rates on 5-year
average current account/GDP ratios, with country and period xed e¤ects (the coe¢ cients estimated
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without xed e¤ects are similar in sign and signicance). Signicantly negative coe¢ cients indicate
that current account surpluses are correlated with labor market deregulation. If variation in the latter
respect is treated as exogenous, driven perhaps by randomly di¤erent amounts of attention paid to
the advice of international organizations by di¤erent countriespolicy-makers, then the data can be
read as saying that labor market deregulation improves countriescompetitiveness. The observed
pattern, however, is also that implied across di¤erently capital-abundant countries by easier capital
mobility when, as in Section 3s model, distributional motives shape labor market institutions.
The estimated relationships could be spuriously driven by unobservable factors, such as politi-
cal shifts that trigger labor market deregulation and improve competitiveness. The regressions in
columns 3 and 4 of Table 9 attempt to isolate the role of nancial integration instrumenting the
current account with indicators of gross nancial integration (Broner and others, 2013) and dummies
indicating adoption of the euro by 10 countries, starting in the 2000-04 period (without accounting
for the nancial integration impact of the subsequent crises). These instruments are meant to amplify
the portion of current account variation that reects easier international investment. They cannot
disentangle the e¤ects of positive and negative capital ows, however, and their exclusion from the
second stage may be invalid if political factors drive both labor market reforms and international
nancial deregulation. The estimated slope coe¢ cients are negative, consistently with Section 3s
simple model. But the instruments are weak, and the coe¢ cients are statistically signicant only
when xed e¤ects are omitted and only for the labor tax wedge (perhaps suggesting that the portion
of current account variation due to nancial integration is more relevant to government budgets than
to labor market deregulation).
4.3 Unemployment, shocks, and changing institutions
Table 10 explores the explanatory power of institutions and shocks for unemployment in the extended
BW dataset. Many unobservable sources of variation certainly matter for unemployment. Those
that are constant over time can be controlled by the country xed e¤ects included in the regressions
along with the four institutions measured on a time-varying basis and shocks (and the Portuguese
revolution dummy).
These data and simple theory do not disagree with each other: all slope coe¢ cients have the
expected positive sign when they are signicant. Insignicance of employment protection is not the-
oretically surprising because higher turnover costs reduce both unemployment inows and outows,
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and have small and ambiguous average e¤ects. Labor taxation should (all else equal) reduce both
labor supply and labor demand without increasing unemployment, but its signicantly positive coef-
cient suggests that large tax wedges are positively correlated with institutional constraints on wage
exibility. Time-varying union density might in principle capture some of those factors. In practice,
its insignicant coe¢ cient in column 1 suggests that it poorly captures the relevant institutional
features, which may be more appropriately (but also more imprecisely and subjectively) measured
by coverageand coordinationindices. All three BW shocks are signicant and correctly signed
in column 1, but only the real interest rate is robust to controlling for period e¤ects in column 2:
the empirical time variation of TFP growth and labor shares is empirically hard to distinguish from
that of other unobservable unemployment determinants, and the same is the case for unemployment
insurance generosity. Columns 3 and 4 include the current account to GDP ratio, which is positive
but insignicant when period e¤ects are included; controlling for the variation captured by period
e¤ects or the current account yields a positive and signicant coe¢ cient estimate for union density.
A causal interpretation of these regressions is only warranted if exogenous political and economic
factors drive the variation of institutions (and of shocks). In accounting terms, excluding institutions
would lower the R2 of the regressions in Table 10 by about 0.05 (without period e¤ects) or 0.03 (with
period e¤ects); excluding shocks instead the R2 declines by 0.12 or 0.04, respectively. This and
the broadly sensible pattern of coe¢ cients suggest that, over the longer time span of the extended
sample, unemployment covaries with institutions directly, and not just with their shocks interaction.
Theoretically plausible interactions may also be empirically relevant, however. A moderate dose
of theory-inspired specication searching allows regressions to detect some sensible patterns believ-
ably, at least for readers familiar with the once popular and inuential (European) unemployment
country-panel regressions. As discussed in Section 3.2, for example, the strength of the empirical
relationship between unemployment and the labor-share-based indicator of the size and direction of
labor demand shocks depends on a variety of technological and institutional factors, of which one
is at least imprecisely observable and of policy interest: in countries and periods where employment
protection is more stringent, not only wages but also and especially employment react sluggishly to
shocks. Hence, the labor share can uctuate without much employment variation, and unemploy-
ment should be less sensitive to variation of the BW labor demand shocks. To detect this in the data
the regressions of Table 11 include the real rate and current account/GDP, the more signicant and
robust shocks in Table 10, along with the rst di¤erence rather than the level of the labor demand
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shock, its interaction with time-varying employment protection, other time-varying institutions, and
country xed e¤ects. The interaction term is estimated to be negative, in line with theoretical ex-
pectations, and signicantly so when the regressions control for lagged unemployment. The large
and very signicant coe¢ cient of the lagged dependent variable might call for further renements,
which could doubtlessly yield results that adhere more closely to theoretical expectations.
5 Concluding comments
Blanchard (2006) recognized that macroeconomists had entered the 1970s without a model of
the natural rate, and had not anticipated stagation and that they had later found it fruitful
to explain unemployment with adverse shocks interacting with country-specic collective bargain-
ing structuresThat approach captured key features of the data when institutions set up around
1970 were confronted by productivity slowdowns and restrictive monetary policies, and ripe for the
exibility-oriented reforms advocated by OECD (1994) and many others. Its inability to t more
recent data suggests that the world has changed in ways that require revision of empirical models
and perhaps also of policy advice.
Because institutional reforms over the past two decades are diverse and poorly captured by coun-
try and period xed e¤ects, regressions should include the main e¤ect of institutions, not only their
interaction with shocks. Country-specic reforms may perhaps have been triggered by persuasive
research-based policy advice, but the politico-economic mechanisms that jointly shape unemploy-
ment and policies are only beginning to be understood. In theory, unemployment can be a natural
side e¤ect of institutions meant to redistribute welfare across individuals, and is shaped by interna-
tional economic integration as well as by other structural and political factors. Empirically, macro-
economic shocks and institutional reforms account for a large portion of unemployments variation,
and capital mobility plays a signicant and sensible role both as a shock determining unemployment
at given institutions, and as a driver of institutional change.
The BW specication o¤ered remarkably robust and interpretable results on the then-available
sample. Current account variation is strongly and robustly associated to unemployment in more
recent decades. Its association with institutional reforms, while more elusive, o¤ers intriguing em-
pirical support to a distributional interpretation of labor market institutions and reforms, and can
be of interest to those who need to formulate and express policy advice. Institutions and policies
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have pros and cons that di¤er not only across countries and over time (Blanchard, Jaumotte and
Loungani, 2014) but also across individuals. If labor policy has distributional as well as e¢ ciency-
oriented objectives, its conguration reects the decisive political coalitions objectives and on the
conditions in which it is implemented. Research economists can plausibly claim to have better infor-
mation than the public about the varying intensity of institutionspros and cons, but their advice
should not disregard distributional implications.
19
References
Baccaro, Lucio and Diego Rei, 2007. Institutional Determinants of Unemployment in OECD Coun-
tries: Does the Deregulatory View Hold Water? International Organization 61, 527-569.
Bagliano, Fabio-Cesare and Giuseppe Bertola, 2007. Models for Dynamic Macroeconomics. Oxford
University Press, Oxford and New York.
Bassanini, Andrea, and Romain Duval, 2006. The determinants of unemployment across OECD
countries: Reassessing the role of policies and institutions. OECD Economic Studies 42 (1),
7-86.
Bertola, Giuseppe, 2015. What Is Natural About Unemployment? Policy sources and implications
of labor market rigidities. In: Re-evaluating labor market dynamics, Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City, Kansas City, 421-460.
Bertola, Giuseppe, 2016. Labor policies and capital mobility in theory and in EMU. European
Economic Review 87, 6277.
Bertola, Giuseppe, 2017. Wedges: Distribution, Distortions, and Market Integration. CEPR
DP11980.
Bertola, Giuseppe, Francine D. Blau, and Lawrence M. Kahn, 2002. Comparative Analysis of
Labor Market Outcomes: Lessons for the US from International Long-Run Evidence. In: The
Roaring Nineties: Can Full Employment Be Sustained?, ed. by A. B.Krueger and R.M.Solow,
New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 159-218.
Bertola, Giuseppe, Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn, 2007. Labor Market Institutions and
Demographic Employment Patterns. Journal of Population Economics 20, 833867.
Blanchard, Olivier J., 1997. The Medium Run. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2:1997,
89-158.
Blanchard, Olivier J., 2006. European unemployment: the evolution of facts and ideas. Economic
Policy 45, 5-59.
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Francesco Giavazzi, 2002. Current Account Decits in the Euro Area:
The End of the Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2:2002,
147-186.
Blanchard, Olivier J., Florence Jaumotte and Prakash Loungani, 2014. Labor market policies and
IMF advice in advanced economies during the Great Recession. IZA Journal of Labor Policy
3:2.
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Thomas Philippon, 2004. The Quality of Labor Relations and Unem-
ployment. unpublished (http://web.mit.edu/blanchar/www/articles.html)
20
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Thomas Philippon, 2006. Unemployment and the Quality of Labor
Relations II. unpublished (http://web.mit.edu/blanchar/www/articles.html)
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Lawrence H. Summers, 1986. Hysteresis and the European Unemploy-
ment Problem. In: S. Fischer (Ed.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1987, Cambridge: MIT
Press, 15-78.
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Justin Wolfers, 2000. The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of
European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence. Economic Journal 110:462, C1-33.
Broner, Fernando, Tatiana Didier, Aitor Erce and Sergio Schmukler, 2013. Gross Capital Flows:
Dynamics and Crises. Journal of Monetary Economics 60(1) 113-133.
Hall, Robert E., 2005. Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness. American
Economic Review 95, 50-65.
Michaillat, Pascal, 2012. Do Matching Frictions Explain Unemployment? Not in Bad Times.
American Economic Review 102, 1721-50.
Mortensen, Dale M. and Christopher Pissarides, 1994. Job Creation and Job Destruction in the
Theory of Unemployment. Review of Economic Studies 61, 397-415.
Nickell, Stephen, 1997. Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus North America.
Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(3), 55-74.
Nickell, Stephen, Luca Nunziata and Wolfgang Ochel, 2005. Unemployment in the OECD Since
the 1960s. What Do We Know? Economic Journal 115:500, 127.
OECD, 1994. The Jobs Study: Facts, Analysis, Strategy. Paris: OECD.
Phelps, Edmund and Gyl Zoega, 1998. Natural Rate Theory and OECD Unemployment. Eco-
nomic Journal 108, 782-801.
21
Austria Belgium
Finland
France Germany
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e,
 A
M
E
C
O
19
60
-19
64
19
65
-19
69
19
70
-19
74
19
75
-19
79
19
80
-19
84
19
85
-19
89
19
90
-19
94
19
95
-19
99
20
00
-20
04
20
05
-20
09
20
10
-20
14
Denmark
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
.1
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e,
 A
M
E
C
O
19
60
-19
64
19
65
-19
69
19
70
-19
74
19
75
-19
79
19
80
-19
84
19
85
-19
89
19
90
-19
94
19
95
-19
99
20
00
-20
04
20
05
-20
09
20
10
-20
14
Australia
Canada
Japan
New Zealand
United States
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
.1
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e,
 A
M
E
C
O
19
60
-19
64
19
65
-19
69
19
70
-19
74
19
75
-19
79
19
80
-19
84
19
85
-19
89
19
90
-19
94
19
95
-19
99
20
00
-20
04
20
05
-20
09
20
10
-20
14
Unemployment rate, AMECO
Figure 1: Unemployment rates by 5-year periods (source: AMECO). Thick lines plot unweighted
averages.
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Figure 2: Time paths of 5-period average shocks indicators constructed on the basis of BW denitions
using AMECO and OECD annual data (see the Data Appendix for denitions and sources). Thick
lines plot unweighted averages.
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Figure 3: Actual unemployment changes and predictions of the regressions of Table 5 column 1 (top
left panel), Table 5 column 2 (top right panel), and Table 5 column 3 (bottom panels).
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Figure 4: Current account / GDP ratios over 5-year periods (source: AMECO). Thick lines plot
unweighted averages.
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Figure 5: Actual unemployment changes and predictions of the regressions of Table 8 column 1 (top
left panel), Table 8 column 2 (top right panel), and Table 8 column 3 (bottom panels).
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Table 1: Replication and update of BW Table 1
(1) (2) (3)
UI repl.rate 0.0172*** 0.0158*** 0.0446***
(4.67) (4.37) (2.65)
UI benef.length 0.207*** 0.165*** 0.0694
(5.30) (3.82) (0.32)
Active labor policy 0.0178** 0.00398 0.0329
(2.37) (0.63) (0.92)
Empl.protection 0.0455*** 0.0466*** 0.0783
(3.42) (3.06) (1.11)
Tax wedge 0.0181*** 0.00644 -0.00244
(2.63) (1.05) (-0.08)
Union coverage 0.0927 0.149 1.289
(0.58) (0.89) (1.56)
Union density 0.00867* 0.00122 0.0351*
(1.87) (0.30) (1.78)
Coordination 0.304*** 0.283*** 1.572***
(6.08) (5.13) (4.24)
R-Square 0.89 0.95 0.82
Parameters 33 37 32
Observations 159 220 120
t statistics in parentheses
Dependent variable: Unemployment rate
Column 1: original BW dataset.
Column 2: AMECO unemployment, BW institutions.
Column 3: only recent sample.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2: Replication and update of BW Table 2 col 1
(1) (2) (3)
UI repl.rate 0.0153*** 0.0138*** 0.0446**
(3.64) (3.61) (2.25)
UI benef.length 0.223*** 0.175*** 0.0694
(4.86) (3.93) (0.28)
Active labor policy 0.0150** 0.00132 0.0329
(1.98) (0.20) (0.90)
Empl.protection 0.0556*** 0.0529*** 0.0783
(3.02) (2.87) (0.75)
Tax wedge 0.0126 0.00167 -0.00244
(1.64) (0.25) (-0.07)
Union coverage -0.0696 0.0156 1.289
(-0.36) (0.08) (1.15)
Union density 0.00874* 0.000394 0.0351
(1.68) (0.08) (1.37)
Coordination 0.274*** 0.252*** 1.572***
(4.89) (4.25) (3.60)
R-Square 0.82 0.93 0.66
Parameters 21 25 21
Observations 159 220 120
t statistics in parentheses
Dependent variable: Unemployment rate
Column 1: original BW dataset.
Column 2: AMECO unemployment, BW institutions.
Column 3: only recent sample.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3: Replication and update of BW Table 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
UI repl rate, 1st year 0.00728*
(1.74)
UI repl.rate 0.0187*** 0.0159*** 0.0146*** 0.0155*** 0.0146***
(3.06) (4.05) (3.61) (3.65) (3.34)
Active labor policy 0.00538 0.0185** -0.00478 -0.000268
(0.45) (2.38) (-0.82) (-0.05)
Empl.protection 0.0325* 0.0155 -0.0337 0.0115 -0.000976
(1.68) (0.23) (-0.46) (0.14) (-0.02)
Tax wedge 0.0151 0.0217*** 0.0128* 0.0150** 0.0208***
(1.63) (3.01) (1.74) (2.07) (3.01)
Union coverage 0.389** 0.742*** 0.611*** 0.522***
(2.41) (5.75) (4.39) (3.98)
Union density 0.000116 0.00483 -0.00817 -0.00144 -0.00493*
(0.02) (0.96) (-1.63) (-0.38) (-1.72)
Coordination 0.324*** 0.373*** 0.236*** 0.276***
(6.78) (5.90) (4.36) (4.29)
R-Square 0.87 0.87 0.94 0.94 0.93
Parameters 33 32 36 36 33
Observations 159 159 220 220 220
t statistics in parentheses
Dependent variable: Unemployment rate
Column 1: original dataset, replicates BW col.2.
Column 2: original dataset, replicates BW col.4.
Column 3: extended data, time-varying UI repl.rate and EPL.
Column 4: time-varying UI repl.rate and EPL, tax, union density.
Column 5: no time-invariant institutions.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 4: Replication and update of BW Table 4, column 1
(1) (2) (3)
-TFP growth 0.425*** 0.483*** -0.448*
(2.79) (3.40) (-1.73)
Real rate 0.618*** 0.840*** 0.803***
(5.15) (8.32) (4.58)
LD shock 0.177** 0.0512 0.102*
(2.40) (1.54) (1.82)
R-Square 0.66 0.65 0.75
Parameters 23 23 22
Observations 131 198 115
t statistics in parentheses
Dependent variable: Unemployment rate
Column 1: BW dataset (with Port.rev.dummy).
Column 2: AMECO unemployment, spliced shocks.
Column 3: only recent sample.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5: Replication and update of BW Table 5, column 1
(1) (2) (3)
-TFP growth 0.715*** 0.755*** -0.219**
(5.00) (4.18) (-2.00)
Real rate 0.471*** 0.859*** 0.651***
(5.20) (8.61) (4.82)
LD shock 0.190** 0.0177 0.0176
(2.10) (0.47) (1.00)
UI repl.rate 0.0253*** 0.0147*** 0.0391***
(5.04) (3.24) (2.79)
UI benef.length 0.267*** 0.229*** 0.209
(4.37) (3.80) (1.03)
Active labor policy 0.0287 0.0136 0.0150
(1.66) (0.88) (0.55)
Empl.protection 0.0949*** 0.0361 0.119**
(3.35) (1.38) (2.57)
Tax wedge 0.0334*** 0.0210* -0.0274
(2.86) (1.91) (-1.13)
Union coverage -0.502 0.0683 0.888
(-1.56) (0.24) (1.31)
Union density 0.0342*** -0.00773 0.0272*
(3.65) (-0.94) (1.78)
Coordination 0.415*** 0.192 1.144***
(4.32) (1.47) (3.46)
R-Square 0.91 0.92 0.84
Parameters 32 32 29
Observations 131 198 115
t statistics in parentheses
Dependent variable: Unemployment rate
Column 1: BW dataset (with Port.rev.dummy).
Column 2: AMECO unemployment, spliced shocks.
Column 3: only recent sample.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 6: Replication and update of BW Table 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
- TFP growth 0.541*** 0.658*** 0.748*** 0.741*** 0.733***
(3.57) (3.98) (3.96) (3.89) (4.28)
Real rate 0.509*** 0.505*** 0.896*** 0.943*** 0.937***
(5.49) (5.31) (8.77) (8.82) (9.05)
LD shock 0.172* 0.177* 0.0276 0.0174 0.0465*
(1.93) (1.86) (0.83) (0.64) (1.82)
UI repl rate, 1st year 0.00813
(1.12)
UI repl.rate 0.0133 0.0216*** 0.00333 0.00409 0.00473
(1.16) (3.98) (0.49) (0.63) (0.69)
Active labor policy 0.00109 0.0100 -0.00223 0.00193
(0.06) (0.58) (-0.15) (0.13)
Empl.protection 0.0492 0.0940* -0.121 -0.0690 -0.0247
(1.24) (1.68) (-1.44) (-0.80) (-0.55)
Tax wedge 0.0181 0.0296** 0.0285* 0.0257 0.0322***
(1.12) (2.32) (1.72) (1.43) (3.44)
Union coverage 0.214 0.526*** 0.477 0.359
(0.58) (2.68) (1.56) (1.13)
Union density 0.0132 0.0223*** -0.0198*** -0.0156*** -0.0172***
(1.19) (2.88) (-3.02) (-3.10) (-3.67)
Coordination 0.285** 0.518*** 0.0853 0.104
(2.57) (4.12) (0.82) (1.07)
R-Square 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.91
Parameters 32 31 31 31 28
Observations 131 131 198 198 198
t statistics in parentheses
Dependent variable: Unemployment rate
Column 1: original dataset, replicates BW col.2.
Column 2: original dataset, replicates BW col.4.
Column 3: extended data, time-varying UI repl.rate and EPL.
Column 4: time-varying UI repl.rate and EPL, tax, union density.
Column 5: no time-invariant institutions.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 7: Controlling for current account in BW Table 4, column 1
(1) (2) (3)
-TFP growth 0.440*** 0.482*** -0.120
(2.76) (3.51) (-0.49)
Real rate 0.593*** 0.854*** 1.012***
(4.85) (8.87) (6.12)
LD shock 0.171** 0.0444 0.0867*
(2.29) (1.40) (1.70)
Current account / GDP 0.190 0.242*** 0.375***
(1.25) (3.46) (4.54)
R-Square 0.67 0.68 0.80
Parameters 24 24 23
Observations 126 193 114
t statistics in parentheses
Dependent variable: Unemployment rate
Column 1: BW dataset (with Port.rev.dummy).
Column 2: AMECO unemployment, spliced shocks.
Column 3: only recent sample.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 8: Controlling for current account in BW Table 5, column 1
(1) (2) (3)
-TFP growth 0.742*** 0.815*** -0.132
(4.85) (4.58) (-1.21)
Real rate 0.447*** 0.910*** 0.711***
(4.98) (10.40) (4.77)
LD shock 0.173* -0.000282 0.0181
(1.73) (-0.01) (0.92)
Current account / GDP 0.142 0.233*** 0.110
(1.26) (3.80) (1.32)
UI repl.rate 0.0266*** 0.0147*** 0.0323**
(5.32) (3.46) (2.30)
UI benef.length 0.261*** 0.215*** 0.198
(4.08) (3.67) (1.00)
Active labor policy 0.0310** -0.00333 0.00739
(1.99) (-0.30) (0.23)
Empl.protection 0.104*** 0.0361 0.0787
(3.48) (1.45) (1.40)
Tax wedge 0.0341*** 0.0189* -0.0188
(3.01) (1.87) (-0.78)
Union coverage -0.624* 0.0846 0.832
(-1.81) (0.28) (1.16)
Union density 0.0358*** -0.00533 0.0208
(4.09) (-0.78) (1.37)
Coordination 0.418*** 0.213* 0.918**
(4.61) (1.97) (2.59)
R-Square 0.92 0.93 0.84
Parameters 32 33 30
Observations 126 193 114
t statistics in parentheses
Dependent variable: Unemployment rate
Column 1: BW dataset (with Port.rev.dummy).
Column 2: AMECO unemployment, spliced shocks.
Column 3: only recent sample.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 9: Capital ows and labor policy reforms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax wedge UI replacemente rate Tax wedge UI replacemente rate
Current account / GDP -0.101** -0.612*** -0.997** -0.520
(-2.25) (-3.92) (-2.04) (-0.83)
Country fe Yes Yes No No
Period fe Yes Yes No No
Parameters 29 29 1 1
Observations 195 195 140 140
t statistics in parentheses
Dependent variable: rst di¤erence of institutions, as noted.
Columns 3, 4: current account instrumented with gross capital ows and EMU dummy.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 10: Linear regressions on the extended and updated BW sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UI repl.rate 0.000559** -0.0000388 0.000452** 0.0000127
(2.60) (-0.18) (2.06) (0.06)
Empl.protection -0.00239 -0.00474 -0.000223 -0.00408
(-0.55) (-1.33) (-0.06) (-1.08)
Tax wedge 0.00168** 0.00131** 0.00125** 0.00116**
(2.58) (2.59) (2.05) (2.25)
Union density 0.000317 0.000583*** 0.000495*** 0.000562***
(1.61) (2.89) (2.78) (2.79)
- TFP growth 0.359*** -0.0904 0.390*** -0.0453
(2.62) (-0.71) (3.01) (-0.37)
Real rate 0.690*** 0.651*** 0.742*** 0.700***
(6.53) (3.13) (6.78) (3.16)
LD shock 0.0718** -0.0147 0.0769** 0.00303
(2.05) (-0.47) (2.41) (0.10)
Current account / GDP 0.238*** 0.124*
(3.39) (1.95)
Country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period fe No Yes No Yes
R-Square 0.69 0.80 0.72 0.81
Parameters 27 37 28 38
Observations 198 198 193 193
t statistics in parentheses
Dependent variable: Unemployment rate.
Portugal revolution dummy included in all columns.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 11: Linear regressions with EPL interaction on the updated BW sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Real rate 0.691*** 0.714*** 0.432*** 0.643***
(6.08) (3.16) (3.44) (3.34)
Current account / GDP 0.184** 0.139* 0.0587 0.0732
(2.53) (1.96) (0.75) (1.08)
D Lab.dem. shock 0.0523 0.0169 0.0965 0.0952
(0.40) (0.14) (0.82) (0.98)
D Lab.dem. shock X Empl.protection -0.0691 -0.0190 -0.0836** -0.0495
(-1.43) (-0.43) (-2.14) (-1.42)
Empl.protection -0.00583 -0.00613 -0.00190 -0.00209
(-1.18) (-1.34) (-0.44) (-0.62)
UI repl.rate 0.000919*** 0.000114 0.000534*** 0.000122
(3.40) (0.46) (2.84) (0.62)
Tax wedge 0.00156*** 0.00138** 0.000970* 0.00101*
(2.67) (2.46) (1.77) (1.96)
Union density -0.0000237 0.000470* 0.000160 0.000367
(-0.15) (1.94) (1.09) (1.62)
L.u 0.471*** 0.492***
(4.43) (5.07)
Country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period fe No Yes No Yes
R-Square 0.71 0.80 0.78 0.85
Parameters 28 37 29 38
Observations 180 180 180 180
t statistics in parentheses
Dependent variable: Unemployment rate.
Portugal revolution dummy included in all columns.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Data appendix
The BW dataset covered 8 time periods, 1960-4 to 1990-4, and 1995+ (typically 1995-6), for 20 OECD
countries. The BW data, a sample program, and an appendix outlining data denitions are available at
http://users.nber.org/~jwolfers/data.php .
The BW macroeconomic data were drawn from the OECD Quarterly Business Sector Database (BSDB)
diskette, which was discontinued soon afterwards. A le found at http://fmwww.bc.edu/ec-p/data/oecd/bsdb.dta
makes it possible to check whether the BW indicator construction and time aggregation was performed cor-
rectly (it was, on a somewhat di¤erent release of the data).
The Annual Macroeconomic (AMECO) database maintained by the European Commissions Economics
and Finance Directorate General,
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_nance/db_indicators/ameco/index_en.htm , includes on a consistently
dened basis and since the early 1960s the variables needed to update the BW shock indicators (this article
uses the May 2017 AMECO update). For the pre-unication period a linked Germanyobservation is often
available, otherwise data for West Germany are used here. Some data are missing in AMECO for a few
non-EU countries. As noted below, they are replaced by the BW observation or reconstructed from OECD
data.
The Stata dataset documented here and a program can be downloaded at https://sites.google.com/site/gipbert/data
.
Dependent variable
The updated sample simply includes the AMECO unemployment rate series, available since the very
early 1960s. As shown in the gure it is very similar to that used by BW, but subsequent data revisions do
make a substantial di¤erence for some countries in the 5-year periods that were the most recent at the time
BW was drafted.
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Graphs by cn
For the other variables shown and documented below the AMECO data are used as explanatory variables
for the BW variables in linear regressions, including country dummies to try and control for possible denition
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di¤erences and data revisions, whenever the samples overlap su¢ ciently. Using the estimated coe¢ cients to
predict the indicators results in series that are always driven by the most recent data and weigh them in a
way meant to replicate and extend the BW variables. The resulting series is not as precisely dened as the
ready-made series available for shorter periods in AMECO and/or in the BSDB, but these and especially
the latter do not always appear as believable as one would like in the gures below.
Time-varying institutions
The BW labor tax wedge is the average of 1983-88 and 1989-94 values from the Nickell (1997) database,
which include consumption taxes. The rst imputation step regresses the BW series on that available for
1979-2004 from OECD Taxing Wages 2007 (odd years 1979-93, not for Australia; annually 1993-2004),
dened in terms of income taxes and contributions for manual workers in manufacturing at average full-time
wages. The second imputation step uses a current OECD labor tax wedge series, which starts in 2000 and
refers to both manual and non-manual workers in a range of industries, for Single person at 100% of average
earnings, no child .
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Graphs by cn
For employment protection legislation, the predicted indicator is the BW newep time-varying in-
dex, and the recent predictors are the OECD Version 1 (1985-2013) indicators of regular and temporary
employment protection stringency.
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Graphs by cn
Union density data are available from the OECD, from 1960 to 2014 for most countries. Around 1990
the observations are very close to the constant value drawn by BW from the Nickell (1997) database. Missing
observations for New Zealand (before 1970), Portugal (before 1978), Spain (before 1980) are lled-in with
the earliest available data point.
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40
For unemployment insurance replacement rates, imputation needs to proceed in two steps. In
the rst, the average of the two BW time-varying replacement rate measures (for the initial year and for
the ensuing 4 years) is predicted by linear regression on the OECD summary measure of gross benet
entitlements (available for odd-numbered years in 1961-2005) and country dummies. The t is excellent.
The second step regresses the predicted value of the rst regression on two series of net unemployment
insurance replacement rate series made available since 2001 by the OECD: the unweighted averages across
earning levels and family types of initial replacement rates and of the average replacement rates over 5 years.
Since the raw gross and net series data series are both available only for 2001, 2003, and 2005, this regression
can be run over only two of the estimation samples 5-year periods. Extrapolating its predictions beyond
2005 makes it possible to exploit the time variation detected by the currently available series over the most
recent crisis periods.
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Shocks
The real interest rate is from AMECO, where it is not available for Australia and New Zealand: for these
countries, it is the long-term interest rate available from the OECD since 1970, deated with the yearly log
growth of the AMECO GDP deator.
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BW dene the TFP gap as the deviation from country averages of total factor productivity growth,
computed from the BSDB output, capital, employment and wage data, normalized by the labor share to
express it in labor-augmenting terms. The updated datasets spliced or mix series is the prediction of
that BW variable by country dummies and the logarithmic rst di¤erence of the AMECO databases total
economy factor productivity series. The latter is in most cases available since the early 1960s (with only 3
or 4 observations in the 1960-65 period). Normalizing it by the AMECO labor share measure has no e¤ect
on the prediction. Before 1987 for New Zealand and before 1992 for Switzerland total factor productivity
is not available in AMECO: the missing observations for these countries are replaced by the corresponding
BW data (which appear very noisy in New Zealand).
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Updating the BW labor demand shock requires a more intricate set of computations on AMECO data.
Subtracting from the log of Real compensation per employee, deator GDP: total economy" (missing for
New Zealand and Switzerland before 1991) the log of the ratio of Total factor productivity: total economy
to Adjusted wage share: total economy: as percentage of GDP at current prices" (also missing for the same
countries and periods) yields BWs adjusted (by labor e¢ ciency) log wage indicator, wadj. Adding labor
e¢ ciency to the log of Employment, persons: all domestic industries (National accounts) proxies BWs
adjusted employment indicator, nadj. The negative of the log of the adjusted labor share, -wadj-nadj plus
the log of real GDP (not mentioned in BWs web data appendix, but correctly included when preparing the
data made available), corresponds to BWs ld0 variable. Using AMECO data this is identical, or very close in
some countries, to the negative log of the AMECO adjusted wage share of GDP. Following BW the AMECO
updated labor demand shock uses yearly moving averages of adjusted wages, with weight 0.8 on the current
year and 0.2 on the previous year (this makes no di¤erence to the results, which are essentially identical
when the contemporaneous labor share), takes 5-year averages, and normalizes the result to zero in 1970 (or
the later period when data become available for New Zealand and Switzerland). The mix" series shown in
the gure here and used in the regressions simply splices the BW data to the AMECO series, normalizing the
latter to have the same mean over the last two (just one for New Zealand and Switzerland) 5-year periods
of the BW data set. The OECD Business Sector indicator behaves very di¤erently from its AMECO total
economy counterpart in some countries (such as Portugal, where the revolutionhas completely di¤erent
and much less drastic implications in AMECO data). However using AMECO observations for the earlier
period does not make much of a di¤erence in regressions.
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